ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
Societies differ widely in terms of flexibility and acceptance of technological changes. Success rates as well as contribution to economic development of ICT projects undertaken in developing countries thus vary widely. Technological changes have occurred more rapidly in some developing countries than others (Phillips 2000) . The sources of such widely disparate paths of technological change in societies have been very important but highly underresearched subject (North 1990, 6) .
Obstacles facing and sources of success of an ICT project in a developing country go far beyond economics. In addition to the costs, benefits and performance (Franz and Robey 1984) , political criteria (Franz and Robey 1984; Markus 1983 ) and social factors (Rice and Aydin 1991) influence ICT adoption and implementation as well as outcomes. Put differently, success of an ICT project is tightly linked to the monitoring and sanctioning powers, social norms and cognitive programs of various stakeholders.
In this paper, we seek to address the following research questions:
1. What is the nature of institutional factors that interact with an ICT project in a developing country? What are the mechanisms by which these factors influence the success of the project?
2. How can ICT projects be introduced in developing countries so as to enhance the contribution to economic development?
We draw upon institutional theories and two case studies to address the above questions. The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: The next section provides a brief overview of the methodology employed. Then, we review definitions of the term " economic development" . It is followed by a review of the literatures on institutional theory. Next, we analyze two cases of ICT projects undertaken in developing countries. Then, we discuss lessons learned from the two cases. Finally, we provide some discussions.
METHODOLOGY
There is a serious lack of well-defined concepts and theories on ICTs' interaction with institutions in developing countries. Qualitative studies are arguably appropriate when phenomena as well as relationship among them are not well understood (Eisenhardt 1989; Parkhe 1993 ).
Since the objectives of the study are oriented toward theory development (Glaser and Strauss 1973) rather than theory testing, we employed a case study methodology-a qualitative approach (Eisenhardt 1989; Parkhe 1993; Yin 1994) . By using analytical rather than statistical logic, case studies help understand complex phenomena (Yin 1994). More specifically, the approach of this paper can be described as interpretive epistemology and multiple case studies to construct theory (Montealegre 1999; Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991; Yin 1989) . A multiple case study design investigates two or more cases to provide insights into a condition, phenomenon, or population that can be generalized (Stake 1994).
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The cases selected in this paper are ICT projects in the Andhra Pradesh State of India and OSS projects in China. These projects vary widely in terms of institutional setting such as laws, beliefs, norms, rules and conventions as well as economic factors (Table 1 and 2) .
Since diverse institutional factors are embedded in the unit of analysis, primary data collection is time consuming at best and impossible at worst. Moreover, primary data cannot capture the comprehensive picture of the whole context of ICT implementation process and impacts on economic development. We thus mainly relied on data from secondary sources. For one of the projects, however, we conducted semi-structured interviews with policy makers and consumers. 
ICTS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
The term " economic development" is interpreted differently depending upon the perspectives. The American Economic Development Council (AEDC) defines economic development as: " The process of creating wealth through the mobilization of human, financial, capital, physical, and natural resources to generate marketable goods and services" (Swager 1991, 3).
It is widely recognized that any definition of "economic development" must include "reduction of poverty" (Richards 2003) . Development economists and international institutions such as the World Bank define " Economic Development" as " improvement in the quality of life" (e.g., Todaro 1994, pp. 14-19; World Bank 1991, p. 4; Sen 1981). It may thus be achieved by transforming increased production into augmented quality-of-life variables, such as health and literacy, as well as command over other utility-enhancing goods and services (Fosu 2004 ). Economic Development used in this paper is similar " human development" defined by the United Nations (1990, (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) . Following these definitions, ICT projects that attack poverty or enhance women' s command over resources contribute more to economic development than projects that have opposite characteristics.
RELEVANT THEORIES: INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS
All economic phenomena are arguably also institutional phenomena (Parto 2005) . A corollary of this statement is that ICT projects exhibit important institutional characteristics. For this reason, institutionalists have recognized that the success of an innovation is tightly linked to the context provided by institutions in an economy (Storper and Walker 1989, Sabel and Zeitlin 1997). Viewing from a rational perspective, institutions are mechanisms that provide efficient solutions to predefined problems (Olson 1965; Williamson 1975) . Institutions do so by helping align individual and collective interests. North (1990) defines institutions as the macro-level rules of the game and thus distinguishes the players (organizations) from the rules (institutions) (p. 27). Institutions can be better understood in the context of the tasks for which they were created (Holm 1995 In this article, we follow definitions of institutions suggested by Scott (1995 Scott ( , 2001 2 . Scott has conceptualized institutions as composed of three broad categories: regulatory, cognitive, and normative.
Regulative institutions
Regulative institutions consist of "explicit regulative processes: rule setting, monitoring, and sanctioning activities" (Scott 1995:35). They include regulatory bodies (such as the government of Andhra Pradesh) and the existing laws and rules (such as local procurement and anti-monopoly laws in China) that influence the success of an ICT project. These institutions focus on the pragmatic legitimacy concerns in managing the demands of regulators and governments (Kelman 1987).
Normative institutions
Normative components introduce "a prescriptive, evaluative, and obligatory dimension into social life" (Scott 1995, 37). Practices that are consistent with and take into account the different assumptions and value systems of the national cultures are likely to be successful (Schneider 1999) . While regulative rules are parts of regulative institutions, social rules are components of normative institutions. Normative institutions are concerned with procedural legitimacy and require users and implementers of an ICT project to embrace socially accepted norms and behaviors (Selznick 1984 
Cognitive Institutions
Although all components of institutions are intertwined with culture (Neale 1994:404), cognitive institutions are arguably most closely associated with culture (Jepperson 1991). These components represent culturally supported habits that influence the success of an ICT projects. In most cases, they are associated with cognitive legitimacy concerns that are based on subconsciously accepted rules and customs as well as some taken-for-granted cultural account of technology use (Berger and Luckmann 1967) . Cognitive programs affect the way people notice, categorize, and interpret stimuli.
Scott (1995, 40) suggests that "cognitive elements constitute the nature of reality and the frames through which meaning is made". At this point, it must be emphasized that although carried by individual members, cognitive programs are elements of the social environment and are thus social in nature (Berger and Luckman 1967) . Various stakeholders of a project (e.g., people at different social classes, donor agencies, national and international policy makers, and media), however, have varied cognitive programs that influence the lens through which they view an ICT project. Table 3 presents regulative, normative and cognitive institutions that influenced the two projects selected in this paper. Table 3 here
TWO CASES ILLUSTRATING ICT-INSTITUTIONS-DEVELOPMENT NEXUS

Case 1: IT development in the AP
Chandrababu Naidu, the chief minister of the Andhra Pradesh (AP) state of India during1995-2004, played an instrumental role in the development of the high-tech industries in the state. During Naidu' s tenure as the AP chief minister, the state attracted $12 billion foreign investment 3 . He attacked impediments to the growth of the IT industry measures and computerized government machinery. AP emerged as Asia' s major IT hub as well as a significant producer and consumer of IT in a very short period of time. The Hi-tech city at Hyderabad, the capital of AP, has Asia' s largest software technology complex which houses Microsoft' s development facility and the operations of industry giants like Infosys, Oracle, Dell, GE Capital, IBM, Motorola, Ericsson, Citicorp, Baan/Invensys and HSBC.
Many technology services firms in Hyderabad serve customers in the U.S. and Europe. Many high skilled computer programmers and software developers live and work in the rapidly modernizing city. Like the rest of India, however, farmers living in villages account for 70% of the AP population (globalenvision.org 2004). The IT revolution in Hyderabad has a very little impact on these farmers' lives. On the contrary, consider the neighboring state, Maharashtra' s government-funded Kisaan Call Center. The center provides rural farmers advice from operators speaking their own language treating every farmer as a customer (globalenvision.org 2004). Many farmers in AP villages unable to cope with drought commit suicide. Estimates suggest that AP accounts for 75% of suicide deaths in India 4 .
Regulative institutions
There are different levels of sanctioning and monitoring powers associated with various stakeholders. International agencies' have rules affecting the behavior of individual economies. For instance, the World Bank offers loans only to economies that undertake economic reforms. In the AP case, Naidu' s economic reforms drastically improved credit rating of the state. The World Bank in 1998 provided $557 million for the AP Economic Restructuring Project even though assistance to India was blocked after its nuclear tests. Next, national/state level laws determine who benefits from an ICT project. Naidu' s government in AP, for instance, revised laws against special privileges to the backward population. To take one example, in February 1999, AP government decided that Indian Institute of Information Technology (IIIT) would not provide reservations for the Backward and Scheduled classes and would strictly adhere to the admissions based on merit 5 .
The balance of sanctioning power associated with an ICT project may shift from one source to another over time. Thanks to the democratic system, ordinary citizens also have monitoring and sanctioning power in India. In the May 2004 election, unhappy farmers exercised their sanctioning power and voted Naidu out of office.
Normative institutions
Governments in developing countries, however, have moral obligation to reduce poverty. Naidu' s opponents capitalized on the fact that the ICT projects had virtually no impact on poverty reduction. They attacked Naidu' s decision to raise rice and electricity prices by cutting subsidies as " anti-people" and branded as elitist his cultivation of technology and foreign capital (Chanda 2000). The state' s low per capita income, dependence on agriculture, and an illiteracy rate in excess of 53% reinforced the effects 6 . 
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Cognitive institutions
In the early days Naidu' s plans gained very little cognitive legitimacy from stakeholders. There was a serious lack of belief that his projects would lead to the economic development. One of Naidu' s interviews provides a glimpse of such disbelief:
I used to talk about Singapore, South Korea, even Japan. At that time people used to laugh at me. Even when I spoke about Information Technology, people used to react very pessimistically (Lanka.net 2001).
Cognitive programs change over time but not at the same rate across different groups of stakeholders. The lens through which government employees, farmers, development agencies, national and international policy saw the AP ICT changed at different rates over time.
Initially, government bureaucrats perceived the ICT projects as threats to their jobs and incompatible with their daily routines. The projects arguably jeopardized their jobs as well as the ability to extract bribes (The Economist 1999, September 11). They vigorously opposed Naidu' s IT plans and protested against computerization by threatening an indefinite strike in 1999. Naidu, however, motivated bureaucrats to champion IT usage. Many bureaucrats were labeled as ex-officio IT secretaries. The resistive force from the bureaucrats disappeared. They shared common platforms of views on IT issues, made effective presentations and spoke the same language in public forums (Bhatnagar 1999). . It is reported that the AP Government responded to some of the Microsoft' s demands within a single day, even though it was a holiday.
Economic elites that benefited from the ICT projects also provided cognitive legitimacy to his projects. A college lecturer said:
We can see a big change in our lives since Naidu took over. Most politicians are corrupt, but at least this one works (Quoted in Sidhva 1998).
A majority of the population depending upon agriculture, on the other hand, had persistent negative cognitive programs. Naidu' s neglect of agriculture development and focus on the computer industry cost him the election in May 2004. Y S Rajashekha Reddy, who replaced Naidu, said:
'We stand committed to their (the peoples') development, to mitigate their sufferings. Mr. Naidu only made five percent of the population richer. We raised the farmers' issue in the assembly, and Naidu ignored it'. 7 
Contribution to economic development
While software exports from India registered 56% annual average growth rate in the period 1996 to 2000 8 , AP was the only state in India to register consistently triple digit growth rates during this period -a Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) of 121% (IT People 2001 August 27). Software exports from AP increased from US $1 million in 1992 to US $265 million in 1999.
The Naidu government, however, failed to transform increased production into improving the quality-of-life of rural people. ICT projects in AP employed highly capital intensive technology which is incompatible with the relative abundance of labor (Hawrylyshyn 1978) . Developments in technology and industrialization thus failed to bridge the urban-rural divide or attack poverty and social and gender inequalities (Sen et al. 2002).
Case 2: OSS in China
No other developing countries are even close to the level of achievement China has achieved in the OSS arena. The Chinese government started Linux development in 1998 and has thrown its weight behind the project since then.
Red Flag Linux was established in August 1999. Beijing Software Industry Production Center was similarly a group established by the government to organize Linux development. Red Flag, working with TurboLinux, first introduced Chinese-language versions of Linux (Smith 2000). Building on RedFlag and Cosix Linux, and coordinating the efforts of a hundred software engineers across 18 organizations, Yangfan Linux was launched by the center in the early 2002. It was installed in 2,800 government computers in Beijing during the first six months. 
Kshetri The Institution-ICT-Economic Development Nexus
Normative institutions
The OSS projects have gained normative legitimacy from various constituencies in China.
National security concerns:
For the PLA and the government maintaining national security falls on the obligatory dimension.
In an editorial on "information colonialism" in 
Principal of self reliance and national pride:
Fear about dependence on foreign country combined with a sense of national pride 12 resulted in the principle of national self-reliance under the Mao Tse Tung era (Terrill 1977). Since then, this principle has been guiding the Chinese economic system. Though attitude toward technology import and foreign investment has changed drastically, due to a lack of significant alteration in its political structure (Solinger 1995, p.127), a high level of advocacy for national self-reliance and domestic development of technology still exists among Chinese policy makers, researchers and scientists (Simon 2001) and more so among military leaders.
The foreign software used in China' s computers has thus long been a focus of concerns. Over the past 20 years, China made several attempts to develop a Chinese operating system, but failed because of the fast development of the global software industry (Goad and Holland 2000). Chinese scientists and engineers are working to create Chinese standards in computer operating systems and audio-video compression to 3G data standards (CNETAsia 2003). They want to achieve self reliance and reverse the flow of fees 13 by exporting Chinese standards. There is also the matter of national pride in having a custommade operating system.
Cognitive institutions
Culturally supported habits and subconsciously accepted rules and customs in China are compatible with OSS.
Perception of exploitation by foreign MNCs:
Although a large proportion of Chinese users do not pay for software, thanks mainly to widespread piracy, those who pay feel that license fees of Microsoft and other multinational corporations (MNCs) are expensive. For instance, Microsoft Windows 98' s price of US$241 translates to four months' salary for an average Chinese worker. An Internet entrepreneur even sued Microsoft for unfair pricing (Smith 2000). Attitude toward sharing: A distinguishing feature of OSS is that unlike proprietary software, it can be " legally" shared. China and the Western world differ in terms of attitude toward software sharing.
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Gallaway and Kinnear (2004) argue that the contemporary cognitive institutions in Western countries do not encourage sharing. Confucianism, which has had a strong influence on the Chinese politics and culture, on the other hand, emphasizes the importance of the family and society over the rights of the individual person (Hofstede and Bond 1988).
Second, in terms of the perception of how innovations originate, Chinese differ drastically from Westerners. Intellectual property (IP) protection in Europe and the U.S. is based on the premises that an individual can create and own ideas (Mittelstaedt and Mittelstaedt 1997). Alford (1995, p. 25) argues that the disagreement of Confucianism with the Western concepts explains the difference in the systems of copyrights and attitudes towards piracy.
Contribution to economic development
OSS is rapidly diffusing in China. The number of companies involved in developing Linux in China as well as providing software and services for Chinese Linux users is increasing rapidly. In the second half of 2003 alone, Linux sales in the Chinese PC market crossed 800,000 copies 14 , a big saving in IP royalty. In June 2004, a Chinese-made super computer "Dawning 4000A", which is based on a Linux operating system, ranked Number 10 in the top 500 list of the world's fastest supercomputers 15 .
LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE TWO CASES
In this section, we explain the " whys" of the ICTs-Institutions-Economic development nexus discussed in the above two cases. The following are some of the important lessons we have learned from the two cases:
ICT diffusion pattern is a function of the cohesiveness of institutional components.
The success of an ICT project depends on the extent to which all components of institutions work cohesively together toward a common mission. OSS projects in China, for instance, have gained regulative, normative and cognitive legitimacy over competing products (e.g., Microsoft). There are thus no difficulties related to institutional adjustment for OSS in China. Chinese policy makers created institutional structure or rules of game (such as MII' s allocation of IT funds for OSS projects and local procurement laws) to facilitate OSS projects. These structures were consistent with Chinese cultural institutions (or in Scott' s terms: normative and cognitive institutions) such as principle of self-reliance and habits of sharing. Put differently, rather than " slavishly imitating Western institutions" (North 2005) , Chinese attempted to create institutions that are compatible with OSS and are derived from their cultural institutions.
An ICT project that ignores socially disadvantaged groups is like a house constructed on a sand foundation.
In a developing country with widespread poverty, when people have direct sanctioning power, the projects that are elite centered are likely to fail. The AP case discussed in this paper reinforces the observation made by the World Bank' s Charles Kenny: "Poor people don't seem to think that the Internet is the answer to all their problems" (Rich 2003, p. 93). Institutions help individuals understand what may and may not be done (Neale 1994, 403) . In countries that have widespread poverty, policy makers may not launch ICT projects that are economic elite centered. In the AP case, for instance, national and international media and policy makers provided legitimacy to Naidu' s ICT projects. Without support from grass-root people, however, they became like a house constructed on a sand foundation.
Institution-ICT linkage also depends upon the current level of economic development and market size
An inter-case comparison indicates that level of economic development and market size moderate the institution-ICTeconomic development nexus. For instance, since the Chinese market is bigger and more developed than that of AP (or India), foreign investors are more likely to be attracted even without any institutional adjustments. Whereas AP was required to carry out reforms and undergo significant institutional adjustments in line with the ICT projects to attract foreign investors in the state, many foreign investors continue to be gravitated to China even without significant institutional changes. Moreover, China' s stage of IT development allows it to develop its own technology (such as OSS), but AP is at more primitive stages. Furthermore, habit of software sharing, one of the major sources of success of OSS, is related to the level of IT industry development. The development level of IT industry is negatively related to propensity to share. 
DISCUSSION, IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION
The cases analyzed in this paper make it clear that institutions are the real root causes of success or failure of ICT projects. Sanctioning and monitoring power, social norms and cognitive programs of various stakeholders play instrumental roles to determine the contribution of an ICT project to economic development.
OSS experience in China indicates that ICT projects that gain regulative, normative and cognitive legitimacy over competing products (e.g., Microsoft) diffuse rapidly. The AP case, on the other hand, indicates that ICT projects that are incompatible with social norms (normative institutions) and perceived to be top-down (cognitive institutions) face an array of barriers, at least in the long run. In developing countries, when people have direct sanctioning power, the projects that focus on the elites are likely to fail.
In some cases, different stakeholder groups have contradictory preferences. In the AP case, for instance, increased rice and electricity prices fostered positive cognitive effects to lending agencies such as the World Bank but was against the implicit obligation of reducing poverty.
The discussions in this paper are, however, tempered by some limitations. These include exploratory nature of the research and a lack of inferential statistics. These limitations indicate the need for further research in this area. Particularly fruitful avenues include developing and testing quantitative model that combines the effect of the regulative, normative, and cognitive factors. 
